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  • Princen Panier specifically address the issue


    Princen, 2012, Panier, 2013 specifically address the issue of ACE using the commercial database AMADEUS. However, both studies focus only on corporate leverage and the ACE in Belgium. Due to the lack of a counterfactual, these authors consider firms in other European countries, e.g., France, as a control group. Arguably, this approach has shortcomings. First, we study not only the reaction of leverage, but also investment, and we consider not only Belgium, but also all other ACE countries. Importantly, we explicitly examine passive investment. This requires observing the ownership structure of the group, a distinctive feature of the MiDi database. This study is the first to use this data set to address the topic of ACE and passive investment. More generally, we add to the literature on the effects of corporate taxes on the financial structure. Most existing studies rely on cross-country or within-country variations in corporate income tax rates, whereas only a few papers exploit some form of quasi-natural experiment. Examples of studies include Desai et al., 2004, Heider and Ljungqvist, 2015 for the US; Doidge and Dyck (2015) for Canada; and Huizinga et al. (2008)for Europe. In our research design, we exploit the introduction of ACE regimes as exogenous variations in the cost of debt in the non-financial corporate sector. In addition, we contribute to the literature on tax planning of multinational firms. Well-known tax loopholes and tax planning strategies typically involve tax havens or jurisdictions with low statutory corporate income tax rates (e.g., Dharmapala, 2008). The evidence in this paper discloses that a unilateral implementation of an ACE system opens the door for implementing a tax plan with a structure containing only “white-list” high-tax countries. This is the first piece of hard evidence on this issue, and it SR 95531 hydrobromide is in line with concerns raised in policy discussions on potential abuse of ACE systems (e.g, Zangari, 2014). Finally, our paper is related to a theoretical literature that uses computable general equilibrium (CGE) models to simulate the welfare effects of ACE regimes. de Mooij and Devereux (2011) find that an ACE reform would be welfare-improving for most EU members if it were coordinated at the European level. Keuschnigg and Dietz (2007) simulate a CGE model for Switzerland and propose an ACE reform that can increase GNP in the long run.
    Effect of ACE on debt and investment: theory
    Data According to the German Foreign Trade Regulation, German investors must report key balance sheet items such as sales, liabilities, and assets of their foreign subsidiaries. These data are confidential and stored at the headquarter of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Essentially, this database contains the whole population of German firms investing abroad, as the reporting requirements are generally met for all majority-owned affiliates with a total balance sheet exceeding €3 million. It is a distinctive feature of this database that we can observe the full ownership structure of the multinational group. That is, we observe all affiliates that belong to the same German parent firm, whether directly or indirectly held. This is a very valuable piece of information that we will use in our empirical identification strategy. Furthermore, we observe intra-group lending. Table A2 in the Appendix summarizes the variables used in our analysis, including mean values and standard deviations.
    Empirical assessment
    Concluding remarks Yet, this result is not to be taken as an argument against the theory of ACE per se, but rather as a hint to improve the practice of implementing an ACE. The findings of this paper underscore the importance of well-designed anti-avoidance provisions and increasing the credibility of an ACE reform. Further research may disclose additional important evidence.
    Introduction Bioactive peptides are specific fragments of food proteins that confer certain physiological benefits to human health. They are latent in intact food proteins but can be released during food processing such as fermentation, in vitro or in vivo enzymatic hydrolysis (Korhonen and Pihlanto, 2006, Udenigwe and Aluko, 2012). Among various types of bioactive peptides, angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitory peptides have been most extensively studied for their potential in the prevention and management of hypertension, one of the well-defined risk factors for cardiovascular disease (FitzGerald et al., 2004, Miguel et al., 2005). ACE is a key enzyme for blood pressure regulation through the renin-angiotensin system (RAS). Elevated ACE activity leads to increased formation of angiotensin (Ang) II, a potent vasoconstrictor that is responsible for the development of hypertension. Pharmaceutical drugs targeting ACE have proven successful in lowering high blood pressure; however, food-derived ACE inhibitors are believed to be safer than pharmaceutical drugs and to lack of some drug-associated adverse side effects such as cough and angioedema (Beltrami, Zingale, Carugo, & Cicardi, 2006).